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To slow the spread of COVID-19, European governments have adopted stringent 
containment measures. These have led to a severe recession and policymakers in 
European Union countries are providing generous support to help companies cope with 
the immediate consequences. The basic approach has been to provide generous and 
indiscriminate emergency support to help cash-strapped firms meet their immediate 
liquidity needs. But as lockdown measures continue and the recession gets deeper, a more 
comprehensive strategy for the future needs to be designed.
POLICY CHALLENGE
The success of support measures as COVID-19 lockdowns are relaxed depends on the type 
of recovery the EU wants to achieve. At the same time, decisions taken today will have long-
term implications for the single market and government debt. How should further fiscal 
support provided to companies be structured? What implications will different approaches 
have for the single market, government budgets and the EU’s climate strategy? Difficult 
trade-offs lie ahead: a speedier recovery could run counter to green ambitions; national 
rescues could hurt neighbouring markets. The hard choices in the next phases should 
follow a set of four principles, and the recovery effort should be structured around equity 
and recovery funds with borrowing at EU level. 
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1 THREE PHASES OF ECONOMIC 
RESPONSE TO COVID-19
COVID-19 lockdown measures have led 
to sharp contractions in economic output, 
household spending, corporate investment 
and international trade. European 
Union countries have seen an estimated 
average decline in annual GDP growth of 
up to 3 percentage points per month of 
lockdowns1. The EU economy is predicted 
to contract by a record 7.4 percent in 2020 
(European Commission, 2020). 
The impact of COVID-19 on the 
European economy might ultimately 
turn out to be even greater than currently 
estimated. The health and economic 
impacts of the pandemic and the 
containment measures on sectors and 
countries have varied significantly. 
For example, tourism slowdowns have 
particularly hit Mediterranean countries 
and airlines. The construction sector 
has been more heavily affected in some 
countries than in others.
In the fiscal economic policy response 
to the pandemic, three phases can be 
broadly distinguished. 
Phase 1 measures are meant to 
temporarily freeze economies as they 
were before the crisis, to shield healthy 
businesses from bankruptcy and to 
protect European firms from hostile 
takeovers by foreign state-backed 
enterprises. Phase 1 support has been 
crude and indiscriminate, and rightfully 
so. The motto is speed over perfection. 
The national economic measures 
taken in phase 1 are characterised by 
indiscriminate, national-based liquidity 
support to firms and workers. These 
measures are meant to keep firms 
afloat in the face of near-universal cash 
shortfalls, to prevent unnecessary lay-offs 
and to deter hostile takeovers (especially 
from non-EU state-financed enterprises). 
As early as 19 March 2020, the European 
Commission amended the EU state-
aid rules with a so-called Temporary 
Framework to allow governments to 
undertake such measures. However, 
the size of fiscal responses in different 
EU countries has differed widely. For 
instance, immediate fiscal stimuluses 
have ranged from 0.9 percent of GDP 
in Italy and 1.1 percent in Spain to 10 
percent of GDP in Germany (Anderson et 
al, 2020).
Phase 2 will be about solvency support. 
As the lockdowns continue, firms must 
take on increasing amounts of debt and 
draw on equity reserves to meet their 
working capital and investment needs. 
At the same time, credit standards are 
tightening2. For increasingly-leveraged 
firms, bankruptcy looms; solvency support 
through direct recapitalization is needed. 
This phase is expected to last roughly 
until the end of any lock-down measures. 
Lockdowns may well end only fully once 
full immunity or a vaccine is available, so 
possibly well into 2021. 
Phase 3 will then be about recovering 
from the severe contraction phase 
that the likely on-and-off switching of 
lockdown measures will leave in its wake. 
The European Council of 23 April 2020 
tasked the Commission with designing 
a sizable recovery fund, targeting the 
sectors and geographical parts of Europe 
most affected by the crisis. But so far, no 
clear strategy has been presented. We 
discuss the key principles that should 
guide support measures in phases 2 and 
3. One key consideration is that decisions 
taken in phase 2 – who gets bailed out, 
how and under what conditions – will 
determine who is left standing in the 
recovery phase. Conversely, predictions 
about the shape of the recovery and 
about policy measures enacted in phase 
3 (such as demand support) could 
determine whether or not a company can 
be deemed solvent today. 
As countries move to the next phases, 
taking account of EU cross-border effects 
will become increasingly important. 
Phases 1 and 2 have so far largely 
involved national fiscal policy. However, 
differences in state-aid disbursements 
and other support during phase 2 could 
well leave lasting marks as countries 
take different and uncoordinated 
decisions, whether because of fiscal 
space or preferences. Decisions taken 
now will thus shape the single market 
of tomorrow. In phase 3, economic 
outcomes will be shaped by budget 
decisions related to the EU’s multiannual 
financial framework (MFF) and the 
1.   Each month of lockdown 
is expected to cause a 
decline in annual GDP 
growth of 2.4 percentage 
points in Germany, and 
of 3 percentage points in 
France and Italy.
2.   As reported in the 2020 Q1 
European Central Bank 
bank-lending survey. 
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EU recovery fund, alongside national 
recovery programmes. A comprehensive 
strategy for phases 2 and 3 is needed.
2 FOUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR 
MANAGING PHASES 2 AND 3
Moving from phase 1 onto the next 
phases is not simply a matter of providing 
equity instead of debt. While phase 1 in-
jections have been emergency measures, 
phase 2 requires a long-term plan. It also 
requires recognition of difficult trade-offs 
ahead: speedy economic recovery versus 
environmental goals; health of the pri-
vate sector versus public indebtedness; 
solvency versus social cohesion. The job 
now for policymakers is to make clear the 
principles guiding their recovery strate-
gies. Such principles should consistently 
inform policymakers’ choices between 
the possible measures and the inevitable 
trade-offs. Can they ensure that rescue 
plans designed today do not cause unin-
tended damage tomorrow?
But before reflecting on the principles 
that should guide future economic 
support, it is worth highlighting why such 
support is warranted in the first place. 
First, governments impose lockdown 
measures to achieve a public good: 
a healthy population. It is therefore 
appropriate that the public contributes 
to paying for the economic fallout from 
achieving that public good. Second, 
without further support, many jobs will 
be lost. Third, with numerous companies 
failing, invaluable tangible and intangible 
capital will be destroyed. Rebuilding that 
capital and founding new firms will take 
many years, during which human capital 
will be permanently destroyed. 
However, governments cannot and 
should not rescue every company with 
unlimited amounts of cash. This would be 
fiscally irresponsible and could cost the 
single market. A careful balance must be 
struck between public welfare objectives 
and the social, economic and political 
risks of rescue programmes. 
We consider four principles to be of 
utmost importance in this evaluation.
First, only financially viable firms 
should receive solvency support, 
with financial viability assessed in 
terms of both the past and future. 
Taxpayers should not support firms 
that were in bad shape before the virus-
induced lockdowns but assessments 
of financial viability need to go beyond 
published 2019 financial accounts. 
The crisis may well alter consumer 
preferences and production systems. 
Public resources must focus on firms with 
business models that are expected to be 
viable in the post-crisis economy. Rescue 
plans should not be about preserving 
pre-crisis industrial structures. The 
recovery should be about jump-starting 
a healthy post-COVID-19 economy, 
which could mean letting some firms fail. 
Meanwhile, a forward-looking approach 
suggests financing the promising start-
ups of the post-crisis economy. A key 
question here is who should conduct 
these forward-looking assessments?
We favour a mechanism in which the 
expertise of private investors is used to 
support decisions on the allocation of 
rescue funds. Such a system would be 
more transparent and accountable than 
if politicians and their administrations 
are left to decide unilaterally which 
companies to help. Involving private 
investors would help ensure that 
investments are viable in the long run, 
especially if they have a direct interest. 
Even so, credit tightening might lead to 
under-investment and the public sector 
therefore has an important role. 
The local knowledge and analytical 
capabilities of commercial banks is 
already extensively used to distribute 
state guarantees and subsidised loans 
to firms and individuals. Further 
partnerships will be required for equity-
based instruments, especially for the 
more arduous assessments of the viability 
of smaller companies.
Second, state support should not 
undermine competition in the EU’s 
single market. 
One of the EU’s main strengths is well 
functioning competition within its single 
market. Fair competition across borders 
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ensures that the most innovative and 
productive firms thrive, rather than those 
that receive the most state support. 
Relaxed state-aid rules allow EU 
governments to inject liquidity into 
cash-deprived registers (see Box 1 on 
the Temporary Framework introduced 
by the European Commission in March 
2020 to relax state-aid rules during the 
COVID-19 crisis). Inevitably, some 
countries will provide more generous 
support than others (Germany accounts 
for approximately half of the approved 
COVID-19 state aid as of 1 May 2020). 
These differences risk distorting 
competition, especially if they continue 
during phase 2. At the extreme, fears of 
competitive disadvantage could trigger 
subsidy wars between EU countries, 
leading to huge wastes of public money 
(Motta, 2020). The more long-lasting 
differences are, the more the single 
market and therefore the foundation 
of Europe’s long-term growth will be 
affected.
Quantitative limits on the amounts 
of aid (eg the €800,000 cap on grants) 
impose some discipline (Neven, 
2020). Nevertheless, some countries 
will deliver less than the maximum 
authorised amounts, while others will 
go beyond, taking advantage of the fact 
that aid provided under the Temporary 
Framework can be cumulated with 
other types of state aid3. Furthermore, 
quantitative limits on aid to individual 
firms do not prevent major differences in 
the scope of deployment. 
Firms that operate in economically 
less-affected countries will be at a great 
advantage compared to firms that deal 
with insolvent suppliers and clients in 
their daily business.
Rules to restrain the behaviour 
of artificially-competitive firms also 
work to limit further distortions of 
3.For example, €200,000 of de 
minis aid and aid under 
Article 107(2)(b), which 
permits governments 
to compensate firms for 
incurred direct damage.
Box 1:  What has been done: the Temporary Framework
As amended on 3 April 2020 and 8 May 2020, the Temporary Framework provides for the fol-
lowing types of aid, which can be granted by EU governments until the end of 2020:
• Measures that help businesses cover immediate working capital and investment needs:
 − Direct grants, equity injections, selective tax advantages, advance payments, zero-in-
terest loans or guarantees on loans for a nominal value up to €800,000
 − State guarantees for loans up to 90 percent of risk on loans and for up to six years
 − Subsidised public loans with favourable interest rates for up to six years
 − Targeted support in the form of deferral of tax payments, suspensions of social secu-
rity contributions and wage subsidies
• Subordinated debt
• Measure to support coronavirus-related research and development; support for the 
construction and upscaling of testing facilities to develop and test products (including 
vaccines, ventilators and protective clothing); support for the production of products 
relevant to tackle the coronavirus outbreak.
• Measures to recapitalise firms when no other appropriate solution is available.
State aid granted under the Temporary Framework must respect the following conditions, 
among others:
• Firms must be financially viable as of end-2019 
• Firms in the financial services sector are excluded
• The amount of the loans and guarantees per beneficiary is capped at: 
 − Double the beneficiary’s 2019 wage bill,
 − 25 percent of the beneficiary’s total turnover of 2019, or 
 − With appropriate justification, the liquidity needs for the coming 18 months for SMEs 
(12 months for large enterprises). 
• Recapitalisations must not exceed the minimum needed to ensure the viability of the 
beneficiary, and should not go beyond the pre-crisis capital structure.
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the single market. To that end, the 
Commission’s state-aid amendments 
prohibit aid-infused firms from engaging 
in aggressive commercial expansions 
and from acquiring rivals while they 
are repaying the state. These rules are 
welcome additions to the Commission’s 
arsenal. However these new rules rely 
on vague behavioural notions that are 
not easy to enforce – when is a pricing 
strategy ‘aggressive’ and when is it pro-
competitive? – and distortionary in their 
own right4.
Third, state support should support 
and not undermine achievement of 
broader societal goals. 
The EU and its members have set 
themselves societal goals including 
climate neutrality and social cohesion. 
It would be absurd if public funds now 
subsidised the business models that need 
fundamental change. As governments 
engage in bilateral negotiations with 
firms, they are in a uniquely strong 
position to push for the changes that 
normally require years of rule-making 
to implement. Support given to firms 
should be conditional on making the 
changes required to achieve the EU’s 
societal objectives.
Putting conditions on state aid will 
require difficult technical questions 
to be addressed – around monitoring 
and enforcement, for example. 
Political disagreements, for example 
over conditions on dividends and 
bonuses attached to equity injections or 
environmental obligations, will have to 
be resolved. Indeed, a clear definition 
of broader societal goals needs to be 
agreed and supported by the entire EU. 
If the goals in different countries diverge 
too much, there will be a risk of further 
market distortions, with some firms held 
to much higher standards (for example 
on environmental protection) than 
others. 
In light of these difficulties, and under 
pressure to act fast, it will be tempting 
to postpone these discussions until 
after the crisis5. But this would be a rare 
opportunity missed.
Fourth, taxpayers should receive 
their share of the rewards of the 
recovery.
Generous support schemes funded 
by the taxpayer should give the taxpayer 
some claims on future profits. Moving 
beyond emergency rescues, interventions 
must be framed as worthy public 
investments, not expensive bailouts6.
3  APPLYING THE FOUR PRINCIPLES 
IN PHASE 2
Most of the public aid provided so 
far has been in the form of debt 
(loans and guarantees) and does not 
address solvency worries that will get 
worse as the crisis lengthens. At the 
microeconomic level, phase 2 will 
thus be characterised by the need 
for solvency support: direct capital 
injections into hard-hit balance sheets7. 
Phase 2 has been characterised by 
a lack of EU coordination. While EU 
negotiations drag on in the background, 
national policymakers have no choice 
but to draw from national budgets to 
rescue their endangered economies. In 
this phase, EU competition law is the only 
effective tool for response coordination. 
In this context, the principles dis-
cussed in section 3 suggest a large Euro-
pean equity fund should be created to 
ensure a single approach to recapitalisa-
tion measures and to protect the integrity 
of the single market. If well designed, this 
would not lead to systematic cross-bor-
der transfers because equity support 
would be given on condition of receiving 
a share of future profits. 
A large European equity fund 
could operate under the control of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). It  
could build on the existing InvestEU 
plan (previously known as the Juncker 
Plan), via which the EIB working with 
private investors and national banks 
invests in European firms (including 
SMEs) through a variety of instruments 
(including equity). However, the new 
fund would have to differ from InvestEU 
in that it would be based on significantly 
larger borrowing from the EU budget. 
The currently discussed steps in this 
direction, such as the newly-established 
4.  Knowledge that a rival is 
barred from aggressive 
pricing could be an 
open invitation for tacit 
collusion.
5.   None of the rescue pack-
ages given so far to airlines 







6.   Lonergan and Blyth (2020) 
argue that ‘bailout’ is a 
misnomer in the case of 
COVID-19.
7.  On 9 April 2020, the 
European Commission 
proposed to further extend 
the scope of the Temporary 
Framework to include 
direct recapitalisation 
measures, eg in the form 
of equity stakes and subor-
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EIB guarantee fund, are insufficient8.
The fund would allocate capital 
according to the four principles set out in 
section 3. In particular, the centralisation 
of funds would allow for proportionate 
allocation and a consistent approach to 
helping firms in different EU countries, 
thus limiting distortion. Reliance on local 
partners, such as national promotional 
banks (such as KfW in Germany) and 
private financial institutions, would 
leverage local knowledge. Within an 
EU framework, the expertise of these 
institutions would help direct funds 
towards the firms most likely to be viable 
in the long-run. 
Conditions could be attached to the 
disbursed funds, ensuring accelerated 
changes towards agreed common 
societal goals. Better still, the fund could 
be managed for the public’s benefit, 
and the profits dedicated to financing 
societal goals, thus providing a clear 
social sharing of the upsides. European 
taxpayers would thus not be bailing out 
firms, but rather investing in them.
In terms of instruments, equity or 
equity-type instruments (eg transfers 
with remuneration contingent on future 
profits9) are preferable to pure trans-
fers or subordinated debt instruments 
because they allow for a share in future 
profits. However, care should be taken 
to limit the distortionary effects of pure 
equity instruments. Equity should be: 
(i) without voting rights, (ii) with quan-
titative limits, (iii) with a timeline for 
government exit (of these three condi-
tions, only the third is required under 
the EU Temporary Framework). For 
SMEs, equity-type instruments may be 
preferred to pure equity because of the 
known problems associated with valuing 
equity stakes in closely-held SMEs. 
Table 1 summarises the 
disadvantages and advantages of the 
various instruments currently being 
considered by experts, the European 
Commission and member states.
If such an equity fund cannot become 
operational during 2020, it should at 
least become fully operational in January 
2021, when various lockdown measures 
are likely to still be in place.
Short of a pan-European fund, 
the most effective way to limit the 
distortionary effects of state subsidies 
is crude and mechanical: state-aid 
exemptions must be short-lived and 
enforcement must be biting. This would 
risk too little state support, without 
common societal goals. 
4  PRINCIPLES IN PHASE 3: 
TOWARDS A STRONG AND 
SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY
Even if a COVID-19 vaccine becomes 
available, it will likely take several years 
until the level of economic activity of 
2019 will be reached, for three reasons. 
First, despite all the government 
support provided, many firms will have 
disappeared. Valuable physical, financial 
and human capital will have been lost. 
Rebuilding new productive structures 
8. The EIB is in the process 
of setting up a €25 billion 
fund to guarantee up 
to €200 billion worth 
of loans for purposes 
related to COVID-19. This 
is far too little however, 
and is unlikely to ease 
market distortions to any 
noticeable degree. The 
EIB aims at a balanced 
allocation across 
participating countries. But 
€25 billion spread across 
member states is scant 
compensation for the more 
than €500 billion Germany 
has allocated to a similar 
guarantee programme. See 
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will take time and investment. 
Second, households have suffered a 
major shock to their incomes and have 
reduced savings. They will want to rebuild 
their savings as soon as incomes recover. 
It is therefore entirely possible that the 
private savings rate will be higher post 
lock-down, putting a drag on demand. 
Third, global value chains could be 
significantly disturbed for some time 
because of the different stages of the virus 
and vaccination, and because of private 
and public responses to the experience. 
This could reduce productivity.
In phase 3, the EU must play a major 
role – through the MFF and the recovery 
initiative/fund – alongside national 
recovery programmes. As phases 2 and 3 
are intrinsically linked, measures should 
be based on the same objectives. In light 
of that, we discuss the key principles of a 
recovery initiative/fund.
The recovery initiative/fund responds 
to the need to counterbalance the huge 
differences between the abilities of EU 
countries to boost their economies, aris-
ing variable fiscal room for manoeuvre. 
Notably, such a fund should prevent 
two scenarios. First, by relying only on 
national borrowing, the debt of some 
countries could become difficult to fund 
on primary and even secondary markets. 
A rise in spreads would then render debt 
unsustainable in a self-fulfilling crisis. 
EU borrowing that is loaned to member 
states supports primary markets and is 
effectively also a support for sustainabil-
ity as the interest rate advantage of EU 
debt can be substantial. Grants obvi-
ously would provide stronger insurance. 
Second, fearing market reactions, coun-
tries could borrow too little, supporting 
their economies insufficiently and doing 
long-term damage to both EU economic 
performance and political cohesion.
The EU recovery initiative/fund would 
thus be crucial in the recovery phase. It 
should be based on four guidelines.
First: the recovery fund needs to 
focus on broader EU societal goals. 
The EU has committed to lead the tran-
sition to a healthier planet and a new 
digital world (von der Leyen, 2019), and 
it is important that both demand and 
supply-support measures promoted 
under the recovery initiative/plan will 
be consistent with these broader societal 
goals. The planning work done so far 
on the European Green Deal, and on a 
new EU industrial policy, should repre-
sent the starting point for the design of 
the recovery. Trade-offs certainly exist 
between policies exclusively aimed at 
minimising the socioeconomic damage 
left by the crisis, and those also aimed 
at promoting broader societal goals. 
However, it is possible to design recovery 
policies that can deliver on both eco-
nomic and societal goals and reduce the 
trade-offs10.
Second, the recovery fund needs 
to be financed primarily through 
borrowed money. 
It is optimal to smooth the consequences 
of a large shock through time, ie through 
borrowing. Wolff (2020) argued that EU 
borrowing is the way forward to fund 
the costs currently being incurred. In 
the monetary union in particular, such 
EU borrowing would bring significant 
advantages and strengthen the euro-
area macroeconomy, while helping 
overcome the problems of single-market 
fragmentation that result from primarily 
national responses. Purely national 
borrowing would weaken the single 
market and also render the monetary 
union more fragile.
Third, the recovery fund needs to 
strike the right balance between 
grants, loans and accountability. 
Traditional European Commission 
schemes, from the Juncker Plan to 
InvestEU, up to the recently-proposed 
European Green Deal Investment Plan, 
tend to focus on financial architectures 
based on guarantees and loans, in order 
to trigger large-scale private and public 
investment initiatives. Such initiatives 
have been received sceptically in the 
past, given the uncertainties about their 
real additionality (Claeys and Leandro, 
2016; Claeys and Tagliapietra, 2020). 
Given the unprecedented uncertainty 
10. For instance, Hepburn et 
al (2020) showed that there 
is a set of fiscal recovery 
policy types that offers high 
economic multipliers and 
positive climate impact. 
These include clean 
physical infrastructure, 
building efficiency 
retrofits, investment in 
education and training, 
natural capital investment 
and clean R&D. Among 
others, the International 
Energy Agency (2020) and 
the Energy Transitions 
Commission (2020) 
have reached similar 
conclusions.
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faced by companies in the COVID-19 
crisis, these tools will be insufficient, 
even though their additionality is clearer 
now than it was because of the high 
degree of risk. Overall, EU debt must be 
large enough to be effective and not rely 
on leverage alone.
Both are helpful but grants obviously 
provide more insurance, though they also 
imply bigger transfers and are politically 
more charged and their legitimacy more 
difficult to establish. Ultimately, a system 
with large amounts of European grants 
requires in essence a European spending 
programme with central control and 
enforcement. Providing grants centrally 
while exercising spending decisions 
nationally is incompatible with legitimacy 
and accountability.
Fourth, the EU budget’s structure 
and allocation methods should be 
rethought.
President von der Leyen claimed she 
can turn the EU’s budget into the 
“mothership” of the European recovery 
(European Commission 2020). The 
MFF is indeed the EU’s main tool for 
engineering transfers via grants. But 
in order to deliver on the objective an 
effective economic recovery aligned 
with broader societal goals, the EU 
budget needs a structural rethink. 
In particular, it cannot only rely on 
increased contributions from member 
states. The 2014-2020 EU budget was 
predominantly focused on the Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP) and Structural 
and Cohesion Funds (together making 
up 71 percent of spending; Moes, 2018). 
The economic literature shows that the 
CAP provides good income support, 
especially for richer farmers, but is less 
effective for greening and biodiversity 
and is unevenly distributed. The 
literature also shows great uncertainty 
over the real size and effectiveness of 
cohesion policy (Darvas and Wolff, 
2018). In the wake of COVID-19, the 
EU budget should be targeted more at 
the sectors of the future – such as green 
and digital – and made more efficient 
and effective. Finally, the way MFF 
resources are allocated really matters. A 
significant part of MFF spending should 
be targeted at the European regions most 
affected by COVID-1911. To do so, it will 
be essential to introduce into the MFF 
allocation methods a set of parameters 
that prioritise regions that have been 
impacted most by COVID-19, in both 
health and economic terms.
11. Wolff (2020) discussed 
whether and to what extent 
this creates moral hazard 
concerns.
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